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Abstract: In Belgium and France, physicians can charge a supplementary fee
on top of the tariff set by the mandatory basic health insurance scheme. In both
countries, the supplementary fee system is under pressure because of ﬁnancial
sustainability concerns and a lack of added value for the patient. Expenditure on
supplementary fees is increasing much faster than total health expenditure. So far,
measures taken to curb this trend have not been successful. For certain categories of
physicians, supplementary fees represent one-third of total income. For patients,
however, the added value of supplementary fees is not that clear. Supplementary
fees can buy comfort and access to physicians who refuse to treat patients who are
not willing to pay supplementary fees. Perceived quality of care plays an important
role in patients’ willingness to pay supplementary fees. Today, there is no evidence
that physicians who charge supplementary fees provide better quality of care than
physicians who do not. However, linking supplementary fees to objectively proven
quality of care and limiting access to top quality care to patients able and willing to
pay supplementary fees might not be socially acceptable in many countries. Our
conclusion is that supplementary physicians’ fees are not sustainable.
Submitted 27 March 2017; revised 12 October 2017; accepted 7 December 2017
1. Introduction
Driven by the economics of medical practice prior to the spread of health insurance,
physicians applied price discrimination by charging patients according to what they
thought each patient could afford. The use of sliding fee scales persisted until
widespread health insurance drove a standardisation of fees (Hall and Schneider,
2008). Nonetheless, supplementary fee systems continue to exist in countries with
universal health insurance.
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The goal of this paper is to answer the following questions: How can cost
inﬂation of supplementary fees be contained? What is the added value of supple-
mentary fees? Is a system of supplementary physicians’ fees charged on top of
social security tariffs sustainable?
The paper focuses on Belgium and France, and starts with an analysis of the system
of supplementary fees in the two countries. Next, possible measures to curb cost
inﬂation of supplementary fees are discussed. Further, the added value of supple-
mentary fees is analysed, in particular the link between supplementary fees and
quality of care. The paper concludes with a discussion of the future of supplementary
fees in Belgium and France (Box 1).
2. Supplementary fees in Belgium and France
Before the spread of health insurance, physicians applied price discrimination by
charging patients according to what they thought each patient could afford. Cross
subsidies between the rich and the poor were organised by physicians on a micro
level. Mandatory, universal health insurance established cross-subsidisation
between the rich and the poor and between the healthy and the sick on a macro
level. Health insurance has taken over the role of individual physicians in ensuring
access to health care for the poor and the sick. Nonetheless, supplementary fees
are still applied today in Belgium and France, two countries that have a long-
standing history of universal health insurance.
In the following section, an analysis of the system of supplementary fees in
Belgium and France will be presented. First, the regulatory framework for sup-
plementary fees will be described. Second, the current situation will be discussed.
2.1 Belgium
2.1.1 Regulatory framework
The current system of supplementary fees saw the light in 1964, when basic health
insurance became a mandatory part of the social security system.
Box 1. Deﬁnitions and terminology
A supplementary fee is an extra fee charged by health care providers on top of the tariff
agreed upon by health insurance. This tariff may include a co-payment or
co-insurance to be borne by the patient.
In Belgium, the term ‘supplementary fee’ (‘ereloonsupplement’ [Dutch]/‘supplément
d’honoraires’ [French]) is used for a fee charged on top of the ofﬁcial tariff set by social
security.
In France, the term ‘dépassement d’honoraires’ is applied.
In North America, the term ‘extra billing’ or ‘balance billing’ is used.
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The legal basis for charging supplementary fees can be found in the Health Care
Professions Act, which states that practitioners can freely set their fees.1 The Code
of Medical Ethics provides that physicians should be moderate when determining
their fees and be willing to explain to their patients why they are charging a
certain fee.
As from 1964, an agreement on physicians’ fees has been made every two years
between the physicians’ representative associations and the ‘sickness funds’
(not-for-proﬁt entities providing mandatory basic health insurance).2 Physicians can
choose to adhere to the agreement (‘conventioned’ physicians) or they can choose
not to adhere at all (‘non-conventioned’) or only to partially adhere, that is, for
certain well deﬁned days and hours (‘partially conventioned’). Partial conventioning
is only possible for outpatient care. Conventioned physicians get an annual
contribution from the social security system for their pension (4790 EUR in 2017).
Non-conventioned physicians are not bound by ofﬁcial social security
tariffs. They are at liberty to charge supplementary fees on top of ofﬁcial tariffs.
However, supplementary fees can never be charged for emergency care.
Since 1964, the biannual agreement between physicians and sickness funds has
consistently listed situations in which conventioned physicians are at liberty to
deviate from the ofﬁcial tariffs set by mandatory basic health insurance, that is,
for special demands made by a patient (e.g. a private room in a hospital or a
consultation after 9 pm).
The agreement also allows conventioned physicians to charge supplementary
fees for households whose taxable income exceeds 67,636 EUR per year (ﬁgure
for 2017).3 However, since it may be rather awkward to ask patients for proof of
their taxable income, physicians have not commonly used this possibility so far.
All hospital physicians, both conventioned and non-conventioned, are allowed
to charge supplementary fees to patients who are staying in a private room. As
of 1 January 2013, the Belgian authorities have prohibited the charging of supple-
mentary fees for patients staying at least one night in double and common rooms
in hospitals.4 As of 27 August 2015, supplementary fees have also been prohibited
for one-day admissions in double or common rooms. Every hospital has to
deﬁne a maximum percentage of supplementary fees that can be charged
1 Art. 35 Health Care Professions Act (Loi coordonnée du 10 mai 2015 relative à l’exercice des
professions des soins de santé),Moniteur belge, 18 June 2015, p. 35172.
2 According to article 50 of the Health Insurance Act (Loi relative à l’assurance obligatoire soins de
santé et indemnités coordonnée le 14 juillet 1994),Moniteur belge, 27 August 1994, p. 21524.
3 Para. 11.4 National agreement between physicians and sickness funds 2016–2017 (Accord national
médico-mutualiste 2016–2017), Institut national d’assurance maladie-invalidité (INAMI). Available at
http://www.inami.fgov.be/fr/professionnels/sante/medecins/soins/Pages/accord-medico-mutualiste
4 Several associations of physicians ﬁled an appeal in the Belgian Constitutional Court against the
prohibition of supplementary fees in double and common rooms. In its judgement of 17 July 2014, the
Court stated that the new law respected the equilibrium between equal access to health care and an equitable
income for physicians (with the new law allowing physicians to continue to charge supplementary fees in
private rooms).
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(expressed as a percentage of the ofﬁcial social security tariff). Since there is
no limitation by law, hospitals are at liberty to set the maximum percentage of
supplementary fees as high as they prefer.
Supplementary fees can be charged to rich and poor patients alike. Supple-
mentary fees can be avoided by choosing a double or common room in a hospital
and by consulting a conventioned physician during regular consultation hours for
outpatient care.
In Belgium, according to the Patient Rights Act, a patient can freely choose
his/her physician. Reciprocally, physicians are free to refuse treatment, except for
urgent treatment (Nys, 2001; Vansweevelt and Dewallens, 2014). As a result,
patients who refuse to pay supplementary fees may not be treated by the physician
of their choice. Upheaval in the press about physicians pushing their patients
towards private hospital rooms where they can charge supplementary fees,5
eventually led to new legislation, which came into effect on 7 January 2017 and
which prohibits hospital physicians from discriminating between patients who
pay supplementary fees and those who do not.6 Physicians can no longer refuse
to treat patients who do not choose a private hospital room (supplementary
fees being chargeable only to patients staying in a private room). The new law
explicitly forbids hospital physicians to use waiting time to discriminate between
patients who pay supplementary fees and those who do not. The law clearly states
that every patient is entitled to the same quality of care whether or not he/she is
paying supplementary fees.7 However, as this new legislation applies to inpatient
care alone, physicians can still refuse to treat outpatients who are not willing or
not able to pay supplementary fees.
2.1.2 Current situation
Currently, 84% of all physicians adhere to the national agreement between phy-
sicians and sickness funds (INAMI, 2016a). For outpatient care, these conven-
tioned physicians can only charge supplementary fees in case of special demands
by the patient. For inpatient care, they can charge supplementary fees to patients
staying in a private room. Physicians who have opted out of the national agree-
ment between physicians and sickness funds (non-conventioned physicians) are at
liberty to set their fees. However, for inpatient care they can only charge
5 For instance, Belgian newspaper article (2016) ‘Sonja moest van chirurg eenpersoonskamer nemen of
ze werd niet geopereerd’ (translation: Sonja had to take a private, one-bed hospital room or her surgeon
would not operate), Het Laatste Nieuws, 28 November 2016. Available at http://www.hln.be/hln/nl/957/
Binnenland/article/detail/3010975/2016/11/28/Sonja-moest-van-chirurg-eenpersoonskamer-nemen-of-ze-werd-
niet-geopereerd.dhtml
6 Art. 112 Law of 18 December 2016 providing for different measures on health care (Loi du 18
décembre 2016 portant des dispositions diverses en matière de santé),Moniteur belge, 28 December 2016,
p. 89736.
7 Art. 112 Law of 18 December 2016 holding different measures in health care (Loi du 18 décembre
2016 portant des dispositions diverses en matière de santé),Moniteur belge, 28 December 2016, p. 89736.
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supplementary fees to patients staying in a private room. In 2015, 23% of all
patients stayed in a private room (Mutualité Chrétienne, 2016).
In hospitals, supplementary fees range between one and three times the ofﬁcial
tariff. There is a wide variation in price-setting behaviour, which cannot be
explained by observable hospital characteristics (Lecluyse et al., 2009). There are
also signiﬁcant regional differences, with most Flemish hospitals charging 100%
of the ofﬁcial tariff, most Walloon hospitals 200% and most Brussels’ hospitals
300% (Mutualité Chrétienne, 2016).
Table 1 shows that there is a huge span in private expenditure8 between a
private room and a double or common hospital room. The span can be explained
through supplementary fees and – to a lesser extent – room charges, neither of
which may be charged in a double or common room. Room charges for a private
room vary between 18 and 164 EUR per day (Mutualité Chrétienne, 2016).
In 2015, supplementary fees represented 61% of private expenditure for a classic
hospital stay in a private room (Mutualité Chrétienne, 2016).
In 2012, the total amount of supplementary fees charged by physicians in
Belgium represented 781 million EUR (381 million EUR for inpatient care and
400 million EUR for outpatient care) (Calcoen et al., 2015).
2.1.3 Cost inﬂation
The total amount of supplementary fees charged for classic hospital stays in
Belgian hospitals (including minimum one night) has increased by 7.1% per year
between 1998 and 2010. Over the same period, the total hospital bill for patients
has increased by 3.0% (Mutualité Chrétienne, 2011).9 After inﬂation adjustment,
supplementary fees have increased by 32% between 2004 and 2015, whereas the
total patient bill has decreased by 5% (Mutualité Chrétienne, 2016).
Unfortunately, data on supplementary fees for outpatient care are scarce and do
not allow an evaluation of changes over time.
Table 1. Average private expenditure for an admission in a Belgian hospital (EUR, 2015)
Private room Double or common room
Classic hospital stay (min. 1 night) 1,463 278
Surgical one-day clinic 735 122
Non-surgical one-day clinic 437 25
Source: Mutualité Chrétienne (2016).
8 Private expenditure comprises the health costs that are not covered by mandatory basic health
insurance.
9 The ﬁgures mentioned (7.1% and 3.0%) are compound annual growth rates. The ﬁgures are based on
an analysis of all hospital bills of the members of the Christian Mutualities. On 31 December 2015, the
Christian Mutualities covered 4,574,738 people or 41.2% of the Belgian population (INAMI, 2016b).
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2.2 France
2.2.1 Regulatory framework
The current system of supplementary fees was introduced in 1980. At the time,
physicians demanded a higher income and the government decided not to increase
the public health budget, but instead allowed physicians to charge supplementary
fees (‘dépassements d’honoraires’) (Auguste, 2012).
In France, physicians can either receive a salary or be self-employed. The latter
are called ‘liberal physicians’ (‘des médecins libéraux’). Salaried physicians cannot
charge supplementary fees.
Liberal physicians are divided in three categories or ‘sectors’ (‘secteurs’). Sector
1 physicians are bound by the ofﬁcial social security tariffs. Sector 2 physicians are
allowed to charge supplementary fees on top of social security tariffs. Sector 3
physicians operate outside the social security system. Their patients are not
reimbursed by social security.
Sector 1 physicians need to respect the fees set in the national medical
convention, which is concluded between mandatory basic health insurance and
the representative associations of liberal physicians.10 Sector 1 physicians are
allowed only to charge supplementary fees in case of ‘special demands’ made by
the patient, for instance, for a consultation outside normal hours.
Liberal physicians need to choose whether they wish to adhere to the
convention (sector 1 or 2) or not (sector 3). If they adhere to the convention, they
need to choose between sector 1 and 2 when they ﬁrst start a practice.
Only physicians who hold certain titles – for instance, ‘chief resident’, ‘resident’
or ‘assistant’ (both active in hospitals or as a general practitioner) – can opt
for sector 2.11
It is not permitted to charge supplementary fees to patients who get subsidies
from the government for additional health insurance.12
The College of Physicians states that physicians ought to determine their fees
with tact and moderation (‘avec tact et mesure’).13 Physicians ought to use
four criteria: (1) the ﬁnancial capacity of the patient; (2) the time needed and
complexity of the intervention; (3) the reputation of the physician; (4) particular
demands of the patient. Physicians need to give their patients written information
for all fees exceeding 70 EUR.
10 National convention between liberal physicians and social security, 27 August 2016. Available at
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jo_pdf.do?cidTexte=JPDF2310201600000010&categorieLien=id
11 Art. 38.1.1 National convention between liberal physicians and social security, 27 August 2016.
12 In 2014, 7.4% of those covered by additional health insurance beneﬁted from a public
programme providing free coverage to the poorest (‘Couverture Universelle Maladie complémentaire’
[‘CMU-c’]). Individuals with an income just above the CMU-c ceiling can get a voucher to partially fund the
premium for an additional health insurance contract (‘l’Aide au paiement d’une Complémentaire
Santé’ [‘ACS’]).
13 Art. R.4127-53 Public Health Law. Available at https://www.conseil-national.medecin.fr/article/
article-53-tact-et-mesure-277
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In May 2012, the College of Physicians issued a recommendation, providing
that a limit of three or four times the ofﬁcial social security tariff should be
respected when charging supplementary fees.14
In France, there are two types of hospitals: public (‘hôpital [public]’) and private
(‘clinique [privée]’). Charging supplementary fees is a common practice in private
hospitals but is also possible in public hospitals. Physicians working in public
hospitals are allowed to have a ‘private practice’ (‘activité privée’) for a maximum
of 20% of their time. However, it is not easy to verify compliance with this 20%
limit (Auguste, 2012). Part of the supplementary fees charged in private and public
hospitals goes to the hospital in return for using hospital accommodation,
equipment and personnel. This is also the case in Belgium.
2.2.2 Current situation
Whereas for Belgium no public data on supplementary fees are available, for
France both social security (Sécurité sociale, 2016b) and a public agency providing
technical information on hospitals15 collect data on supplementary fees and make
them available to the public.
In total, 59% of all general practitioners and 46% of all specialists work
as ‘liberal physicians’ (Barlet and Marbot, 2016); 25.3% of liberal physicians
are sector 2 physicians who are allowed to charge supplementary fees on top of
ofﬁcial social security tariffs: 43.4% of all specialists and 9.0% of all general
practitioners. The majority of surgeons (79.9%) and gynaecologists (58.9%)
work in sector 2. Sector 1 physicians – 73.9% of liberal physicians – are bound by
social security tariffs. In total, 912 physicians, representing 0.8% of all liberal
physicians, choose to work in sector 3 (Sécurité sociale, 2016a).16
Whereas only 38% of all hospital beds in France are private,17 62% of all
surgical interventions in France are performed in private hospitals.18 Supple-
mentary fees are applied for about half of all surgical procedures in France (Barlet
and Marbot, 2016). For instance, supplementary fees are charged for 60% of
all cataract operations in private hospitals. For cataract operations, supple-
mentary fees represent on average 79% of the ofﬁcial tariff.19 In 2014, a total of
14 College of Physicians. Recommendation available at https://www.conseil-national.medecin.fr/
article/acces-aux-soins-recommandations-du-cnom-1185
15 Agence technique de l’information sur l’hospitalisation. Information available at http://www.atih.
sante.fr/depassements-d-honoraires
16 All ﬁgures for 2014 (situation on 31 December 2014).
17 Association of hospitals. Information available at https://www.hopital.fr/Nos-Missions/L-hopital-
au-sein-de-l-organisation-generale-de-la-sante/Les-etablissements-publics-de-sante
18 Federation of private hospitals. Information available at http://www.fhp-lr.com/Federation-Hospi-
talisation-Privee/Les-cliniques-privees/Le-secteur-MCO/Le-Secteur-MCO-fer-de-lance-de-l-hospitalisation-
privee_47_.html
19 Figure retrieved from http://www.66millionsdimpatients.org/depassements-dhonoraires-en-
cliniques-restes-a-charge-au-menu/
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805 million EUR of supplementary fees was charged in private hospitals.20
In public hospitals, this ﬁgure was 69 million EUR (Clavreul, 2014).
In 2014, supplementary fees amounted to 2.8 billion EUR in France. The bulk
of supplementary fees, 2.5 billion EUR was charged by specialists, whereas only
300 million EUR was charged by general practitioners (Sécurité sociale, 2016b).
2.2.3 Cost inﬂation
The percentage of liberal physicians working in sector 2, who are authorised to
charge supplementary fees, has slightly increased from 24.7% in 2000 to 25.3%
in 2014. While the percentage of general practitioners working in sector 2 has
decreased from 13.9 to 9.0%, the percentage of specialists working in sector 2 has
increased from 37.1 to 43.4% (Sécurité sociale, 2016b). Today, 59% of all new
medical specialists choose to work in sector 2 (Barlet and Marbot, 2016).
Average supplementary fees in sector 2 have risen from 25% of ofﬁcial tariffs in
1990 to 54% in 2010 (Léchenet, 2012).
Between 2011 and 2015, the total amount of supplementary fees in private
hospitals has risen from 676 million EUR to 867 million EUR (+28%).
In 2014, total supplementary fees charged by physicians amounted to
2.8 billion EUR (Sécurité sociale, 2016b), while in 2011 the ﬁgure was 2.4 billion
EUR (Auguste, 2012).
2.3 Additional health insurance
In Belgium, additional health insurance mainly covers hospital costs. Therefore,
the term ‘hospitalisation insurance’ is used. About 75% of Belgians have such
hospitalisation insurance. The bulk of supplementary fees in hospitals is covered
by hospitalisation insurance. About 95% of the French have an additional health
insurance, covering a broad range of inpatient and outpatient health care services.
In France, additional health insurance reimburses both inpatient and outpatient
supplementary fees.
Cost inﬂation of supplementary fees leads to higher premiums for additional
health insurance. In Belgium, for instance, as a result of recent increases in supple-
mentary fees, two insurers have applied premium rate increases for their additional
hospitalisation insurance products of 16 and 47%, respectively (Sury, 2016).
Additional insurance can also have an inﬂationary effect on supplementary fees.
People holding additional health insurance may be less price sensitive. Knowing
that a patient is additionally insured may lead health care providers to charge
higher fees. Dormont and Péron (2016) showed that the average amount of
supplementary fees charged for a consultation to patients holding additional
health insurance contracts covering supplementary fees increased by 32%.
20 Figures on private hospitals (‘cliniques’), retrieved from http://www.66millionsdimpatients.org/
depassements-dhonoraires-en-clinique-les-chiffres-de-laugmentation/ and from http://www.66millions-
dimpatients.org/depassements-dhonoraires-en-cliniques-restes-a-charge-au-menu/
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Insurance also led to an increase of 9% in the number of consultations with
specialists who charge supplementary fee. Feldstein (1970) was one of the ﬁrst to
note that widespread health insurance can lead to an increase in the price of health
care, which undermines the value of insurance and decreases consumer welfare.
2.4 Belgium vs. France
In Belgium, proportionally more supplementary fees are charged compared with
France (see Table 2).
Table 3 shows that the most important differences between Belgium and France
are related to the ‘convention’ status of the physician – that is, whether the phy-
sician has signed the national agreement between physicians and mandatory basic
health insurance – and the possibility for the physician to refuse to treat patients
who are not willing or not able to pay supplementary fees.
3. Measures to curb cost inﬂation
Both in Belgium and in France, there is much concern about the ﬁnancial sus-
tainability of the supplementary fee system. Expenditure on supplementary fees
Table 3. Regulatory framework for supplementary fees in Belgium and France
Belgium France
Are supplementary fees linked to the ‘convention’ status of
the physician?




Are supplementary fees for inpatient care linked to a private
room in a hospital?
Yes No
Do physicians need to be moderate when determining
supplementary fees (College of Physicians)?
Yes Yes
Are persons with low incomes exempt from supplementary fees? No Yes













Supplementary fees charged for outpatient care €400 million €36 €1851 million €28
Supplementary fees charged in hospitals €381 million €34 €793 million €12
Total supplementary fees €781 million €70 €2644 million €40
Sources: Calcoen et al. (2015); DREES; Eurostat.
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increases at a pace that exceeds the rate at which total expenditure on health care
is increasing. Both in Belgium and in France, the bulk of supplementary fees is
covered by additional health insurance. Sustained rapid growth of supplementary
fees leads to sharp increases in premiums for additional coverage. Several mea-
sures can be taken to reverse this trend. In this section, we will give an overview of
measures to curb cost inﬂation of supplementary fees (see Table 4). Some mea-
sures involve regulation by the authorities. Other measures – that is, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8
(and 3.4) – are initiatives which can be taken by additional health insurance
providers.
3.1 Prohibiting supplementary fees
As from 1 January 2013, supplementary fees can no longer be charged in double
and common rooms in Belgian hospitals. However, this has not led to a reduction
of supplementary fees, since more supplementary fees have been charged in
private rooms. Between 2013 and 2015, supplementary fees have increased by
9.7% (Mutualité Chrétienne, 2016).
Physicians wish to maintain their income. Therefore, when a particular source
of revenue is no longer available, other sources are likely to be increasingly
exploited. For instance, if supplementary fees were to be completely forbidden in
hospitals, there might be a shift towards the outpatient sector.
Table 4. Measures to curb cost inﬂation of supplementary fees
Belgium France
Initiated by the authorities
Prohibiting supplementary fees ✓a ✓a
Setting indicative/reference tariffs for supplementary fees – ✓
Introducing supply-side restrictions – ✓
Capping supplementary fees – –
Capping reimbursement of supplementary fees by additional health insurance – ✓
Restricting differences in quality of care ✓b –
Initiated by insurers
Capping reimbursement of supplementary fees ✓ ✓
Negotiating supplementary fees – –
Applying deductibles ✓ –
Applying co-insurance – –
Taking legal action against excessive supplementary fees –c –c
aBoth in Belgium and in France, supplementary fees have only been prohibited for limited groups (e.g. people
who get subsidies to buy additional health insurance) or in certain circumstances (e.g. emergency care).
bSince January 2017, physicians may no longer discriminate between patients who pay supplementary fees
and those who do not. This legislation applies to inpatient care alone. The new rules are not well known by the
public. So far, they have not been enforced.
cLegal action has only been taken by individuals in isolated cases. There are only judgements from
lower courts.
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An alternative to supplementary fees is an increase in fees paid by mandatory
basic health insurance. This has been implemented in the Netherlands. During
several decades of fee regulation by the Dutch government, supplementary
fees gradually converged to 0, without seriously reducing the income of
medical specialists. In 2012, Dutch medical specialists earned more than their
colleagues in neighbouring countries, such as Belgium, Denmark and Germany
(Kok et al., 2015).
3.2 Setting indicative/reference tariffs for supplementary fees
On 25 October 2012, an agreement on supplementary fees was signed by the
professional association of additional health insurers, the representative associa-
tions of liberal physicians andmandatory basic health insurance in France.21 Under
this agreement, the total amount of supplementary fees charged by a physician
during one year should not exceed 150% of the total social security tariffs charged
in that same year. The 150%mark is an average over a whole year, meaning that a
physician can continue to charge high supplementary fees, for example, 400%, as
long as at the end of the year the average is close to 150%. However, sanctions for
exceeding the 150% reference have not been deﬁned and have not been applied.22
So far, this measure has not resulted in a reduction of supplementary fees.
In Belgium, the current national agreement between the physicians’ representative
associations and the sickness funds stipulates that a mechanism of indicative tariffs
for supplementary fees is to be studied.23
3.3 Introducing supply-side restrictions
On 25 October 2012, an agreement on supplementary fees was signed in France
by the professional association of additional health insurers, the physicians’
representative associations and mandatory basic health insurance (see above). In
addition to the 150% reference for supplementary fees, the agreement introduced
the ‘access to care contract’ (‘contrat d’accès aux soins’).24 A sector 2 physician
who signs this contract agrees not to increase supplementary fees above the
average supplementary fees he/she charged in 2012 (with a limit of 100% of social
21 Cf. annex no. 8 to the national agreement signed on 26 July 2011 by the liberal physicians and health
insurance (Avenant n° 8 à la convention nationale organisant les rapports entre les médecins libéraux et
l’assurance maladie signée le 26 juillet 2011), Paris, 25 October 2012. Available at https://fr.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Avenant_n%C2%B08_%C3%A0_la_convention_m%C3%A9dicale
22 Roucous, D. La vérité sur les honoraires des médecins et leur remboursement. L’Humanité. 11
February 2016. Available at https://www.humanite.fr/la-verite-sur-les-honoraires-des-medecins-et-leur-
remboursement-598348
23 Para. 4.3 National agreement between physicians and sickness funds 2016–2017 (Accord national
médico-mutualiste 2016–2017), Institut national d’assurance maladie-invalidité (INAMI). Available at
http://www.inami.fgov.be/fr/professionnels/sante/medecins/soins/Pages/accord-medico-mutualiste
24 As from 1 January 2017, the ‘access to care contract’ has been renamed: ‘l’option pratique tarifaire
maîtrisée’ (OPTAM).
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security tariffs). He/she also guarantees not to decrease the part of his/her activity
where no supplementary fees are charged. In return, part of the social security
contributions of the participating physician is paid by the government. Additional
health insurers promised to improve the mechanisms for reimbursing supple-
mentary fees charged by physicians who have signed the contract. The parties to
the 2012 agreement stated that social security tariffs ought to be increased in order
to decrease the need to charge supplementary fees.
Unfortunately, the introduction of the ‘access to care contract’ has not led to a
containment of supplementary fees. The total amount of supplementary fees has
increased by 6.6% between 2012 and 2014 (Béguin, 2015). Supplementary fees in
private hospitals have increased from 724 million EUR in 2012 to 866 million
EUR in 2015 (+19.7%).25 Physicians who wish to continue to charge high
supplementary fees stay out of the contract. Physicians who sign the contract carry
on with their current practice. As the number of medical specialists choosing to
work in sector 2 is increasing, so is total amount of supplementary fees.26 In
addition, sector 1 chief residents have been allowed to sign the contract as well,
which creates additional cost inﬂation (UFC, 2013). Only 27% of all physicians –
and 23% of medical specialists – working in sector 2 have signed the ‘access to
care contract’. Of the sector 2 ophthalmologists and surgeons, 10 and 15%,
respectively, adhere to the ‘access to care contract’.27 From these ﬁgures, it is clear
that the ‘access to care contract’ has not been a success so far.
3.4 Capping supplementary fees
In neither Belgium nor France has a maximum limit for supplementary fees been
deﬁned by law. Physicians are free to charge supplementary fees, which can be as
high as 500% or more of social security tariffs.
In Belgium, every hospital must deﬁne a maximum limit for supplementary
fees, to be respected by all physicians working in that hospital. However, this
maximum limit can be easily adapted, by a simple decision of hospital
management.
A legal cap on supplementary fees might be an effective measure, since there is
no escape route (apart from increasing the frequency of charging supplementary
fees). In October 2016, an agreement was reached in Belgium by physicians and
sickness funds, limiting supplementary fees for breast reconstruction to 100% of
social security tariffs. This measure has been beneﬁcial to breast cancer patients,
that is, those who do not enjoy additional health insurance.
25 Figures retrieved from http://www.66millionsdimpatients.org/depassements-dhonoraires-en-
cliniques-restes-a-charge-au-menu/
26 Average supplementary fees charged by their specialty in their region is the reference for new
entrants.
27 Mercer (2016). https://www.mercer.fr/content/dam/mercer/attachments/private/nurture-cycle/fr-2016-
barometre-sante-bilan-acces-soins-hb-mercer.PDF
12 P I E T C A L C O E N A N D W Y N A N D P . M . M . V A N D E V E N
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744133117000548
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Erasmus MC Rotterdam, on 16 Feb 2018 at 11:26:08, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
In France, the system of ‘access to care contracts’ (see above) has far-reaching
consequences for the reimbursement of supplementary fees by additional health
insurance. Most additional health insurance contracts in France are so-called
‘solidarity contracts’. Solidarity contracts are exempted from a 7% solidarity tax on
additional health insurance contracts. Since 1 January 2016, employers have been
obliged to offer an additional health insurance contract (‘complémentaire santé’) to
their employees. For solidarity contracts, no social taxes (‘charges sociales’) are
due on the part of the premium paid by the employer and the part paid by the
employee is tax deductible. Contracts which do not qualify as ‘solidarity contracts’
are more expensive for both the employer and the employee. Solidarity contracts
aim at reducing supplementary fees charged by sector 2 physicians who have not
signed the ‘access to care contract’. Reimbursement of supplementary fees by a
solidarity contract is limited to 100% of social security tariffs. This is the same
limit to be respected by physicians who have signed the ‘access to care contract’.
So far, solidarity contracts have not succeeded in reducing total amount of supple-
mentary fees charged. This is due to the limited number of physicians who have
signed the ‘access to care contract’. In addition, the 100% limit for supplementary fees
can be circumvented by buying a ‘supplementary’ additional health insurance con-
tract (‘surcomplémentaire santé’). Such ‘supplementary’ additional health insurance
provides coverage for supplementary fees that exceed the 100% limit of ‘solidarity’
contracts. A ‘surcomplémentaire santé’ can be bought by an individual as an add-on
to his or her additional health insurance or by the employer as an employee beneﬁt.
Additional health insurers can also decide on their own initiative to cap
reimbursement of supplementary fees. In Flanders – the northern, Dutch speaking
region of Belgium – for instance, reimbursement of supplementary fees has been
capped at 100% by the Christian Mutuality, one of the largest providers of
additional health insurance.
3.5 Restricting differences in quality of care
Perceived quality of care has an important effect on willingness to pay supple-
mentary fees. Due to this effect, regulating (i.e. limiting) physicians’ ability to
provide better quality of care for patients who pay supplementary fees could help
to curb cost inﬂation. On 7 January 2017, new legislation came into force in
Belgium, providing that, in hospitals, every patient is entitled to the same quality
of care irrespective of supplementary fees being paid or not. However, the success
of these regulations will depend on their enforceability. So far, there has been
little or no effect on the supplementary fee system in Belgium.
3.6 Negotiating supplementary fees by additional health insurance
Social security tariffs are the result of negotiations on a national level between
health insurers and physicians’ representative associations. This is not the case for
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supplementary fees, which are charged on top of social security tariffs. In theory,
the patient could discuss prices with his or her physician. However, in practice,
this is not likely to be very successful because of the asymmetrical relationship
between patient and physician. When additional health insurance reimburses
supplementary fees, additional health insurers could negotiate supplementary
fees with the physicians’ representative associations. Clout would increase if
additional health insurers would join forces.
3.7 Counteracting moral hazard by additional health insurance
Insurance providing coverage for supplementary fees creates moral hazard.
Insurance that makes all care free of out-of-pocket spending leads to nearly 50%
greater spending (Pauly, 2007). Moral hazard can be reduced by cost-sharing
arrangements such as deductibles and co-insurance and by managed care (e.g.
negotiating supplementary fees, see above). Recently, 150–175 EUR deductibles
have been applied in Belgium. Co-insurance has not yet been introduced. How-
ever, substantial co-insurance, for example, 25%, could be particularly effective in
ﬁghting excessive supplementary fees. Probably the most effective means of
combatting excessive prices is for the insured to be required to retain a sufﬁciently
large share of the risk that it is in his immediate interest to resist outrageous prices
(Berliner, 1982).
3.8 Taking legal action against excessive supplementary fees
Patients can go to court to ﬁght excessive supplementary fees. In Belgium
and France, legal action can be based on the deontological code which states
that physicians should be ‘moderate’ when determining their fees. In both
countries, civil actions are possible based on the good faith principle in
contractual relationships and the prohibition on abuse of a dominant position
(‘la lésion qualiﬁée’). There may also be a role there for the insurer. If amounts
are claimed under insurance policies which are excessive, the insurer should
not shy away from legal action. Judgements of higher courts, that is, supreme
court judgements, could have an important effect on the supplementary fee
system.
3.9 Conclusion
Several measures to curb cost inﬂation of supplementary fees can be implemented
by both the authorities and the insurers. In Belgium and France, several measures
have not yet been implemented or only to a limited extent (see Table 4). In France,
more measures have been implemented than in Belgium. So far, measures that
have been implemented in these countries have not yet resulted in a stabilisation or
a reduction of supplementary fees.
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4. Added value of supplementary fees
Historically, both in Belgium and in France, the system of supplementary fees was
introduced to allow physicians to increase their revenue. Hence, the added value
of supplementary fees for the physician is clear: a source of (extra) income.
However, the added value for the patient is not clear.
In the 1990s, the Belgian courts already dealt with the issue of whether the
system of supplementary fees linked to the use of a private hospital room could be
justiﬁed from a legal standpoint. Two courts – in 1993 and in 1997, respectively –
ruled that supplementary fees are not acceptable unless additional health services
are provided by the physician (‘qu’il existe un “supplément” de prestations en
contrepartie du “suppléments d’honoraires”’).28 The judges stated that extra
services needed to be provided for the extra money paid in order for the supple-
mentary fees to be justiﬁed (‘quid pro quo’). Since the two courts ruled at ﬁrst
instance, the judgements only had a limited impact.
4.1 Added value for the physician: extra income
For certain categories of self-employed medical specialists, supplementary fees
constitute a substantial part of their income (see Table 5). Supplementary fees
represent, respectively, 35 and 32% of the total income of Belgian and French
surgeons.
Table 5. Supplementary fees as a percentage of gross income of sector 2 physicians
(France)/self-employed physicians (Belgium) providing inpatient care in 2010
France Belgium













Source: DREES (2012), Swartenbroekx et al. (2012).
28 Court of ﬁrst instance Antwerp 27 May 1993 (Rechtbank van eerste aanleg Antwerpen), DCCR
1994, 762. Court of ﬁrst instance Liège 12 November 1997 (Tribunal de première instance Liège), JLMB,
1999, 277.
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Both in Belgium and France, hospitals also beneﬁt from supplementary fees.
In most hospitals, physicians have to cede a certain percentage of their supple-
mentary fees to the hospital to help ﬁnance overhead costs.
4.2 Added value for the patient?
Whereas the added value for the physician is clear, this is not the case as far as the
patient is concerned.
4.2.1 Comfort and access
Patients willing to pay supplementary fees may be offered convenient consultation
hours late at night or comfortable private rooms in hospitals. However, while it is
understandable that a patient might have to pay extra to the hospital for the use of
a luxurious private room, it is difﬁcult to understand why he/she should pay extra
to the physician for staying in a private room.
In France, a physician can refuse to treat a patient if he/she is not willing to pay
the supplementary fees charged by that physician. Dormont and Péron (2016)
found that French patients might choose to consult sector 2 specialists, who can
charge supplementary fees, because they have difﬁculties in gaining access to other
physicians, that is, sector 1 specialists who do not charge supplementary fees. If, in
a certain region, there are fewer sector 1 specialists, patients face search costs,
waiting time and transportation costs in order to consult a specialist who does not
charge more than the regulated fee.
4.2.2 Quality of care: pay for performance
In a theoretical study (Glazer and McGuire, 1993), it has been argued that
restrictions on supplementary fees come at a price as physicians have an incentive
to reduce the quality of their services. A physician can be regarded as making two
choices to maximise proﬁt: the price for the price-paying patients (patients willing
to pay extra), and the quality for the fee-only patients (patients not willing to pay
extra). Physicians’ equilibrium choice of quality and price depends on the level of
fee set by the regulator. When the fee is low enough, no patient will be taken at the
fee only. When the fee is high enough, no patient will be charged extra. When
the fee is set in the range between these two fee levels, some patients are served for
the fee, but the quality to the fee-only patients is less than or equal to the quality
for the price-paying patient. Kifmann and Scheuer (2011) applied the ﬁndings of
Glazer and McGuire to Medicare in the United States. They studied the effects of
‘balance billing’, that is, allowing physicians to charge a fee from patients in
addition to the fee paid by Medicare. In contrast to Glazer and McGuire (1993),
they found that allowing balance billing generally is not superior as balance billing
allows physicians to increase their rents. An empirical study of the effects of
Medicare restrictions on extra billing in the late 1980s and early 1990s was
performed by McKnight (2007). She found that these restrictions reduced
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out-of-pocket medical expenditure of Medicare beneﬁciaries by 9%. With the
exception of a signiﬁcant fall in the number of follow-up telephone calls, her study
showed little evidence that physicians changed their behaviour in response to the
extra billing restrictions.
In Belgian hospitals, supplementary fees are linked to the use of a private room.
A review of the literature found that private rooms have a moderate effect on
patient satisfaction with care, noise and quality of sleep, and the experience of
privacy and dignity (van de Glind et al., 2007). Conﬂicting results were found for
hospital infection rates. In addition, there was no evidence on recovery rates and
patient safety. In France, the thriving of sector 2 medical specialists, who can
charge supplementary fees, may be due to patients believing that these physicians
provide better quality of care (Dormont and Péron, 2016). The idea that an
expensive physician must be an excellent physician might play a role. Value might
also be attributed to supplementary fees by patients believing that extra payments
for physicians motivate them to go the extra mile.
Today, quality of care is high up on the political agenda. Donabedian’s (1997)
structure-process-outcome model for quality of care is widely accepted. Infor-
mation technology enables and facilitates the collection and the use of data to
measure and to follow-up on quality of care. For instance, in the United States, the
Core Quality Measure Collaborative, led by public health plans, commercial
insurers, providers and consumers, is trying to reach consensus on core perfor-
mance measures (CMS, 2016).
Pay-for-quality or pay-for-performance payment methods were introduced
several years ago (e.g. Epstein et al., 2004). The pay-for-performance model offers
ﬁnancial incentives to providers to improve quality and efﬁciency. Typically,
incentives are paid on top of the standard fee-for-service compensation if the
provider meets or exceeds certain pre-established metrics of performance. For
instance, the ‘physician value modiﬁer program’ rewards physicians with bonus
payments when their performance attains speciﬁed measures of quality and cost
(Baird, 2016).
The question is whether supplementary fees could play a role in the imple-
mentation of a pay-for-performance model? In the past, patients had little
objective data at their disposal on the quality of health care services provided by
an individual physician. Today, such data are being made available. Processing
such data can provide objective information on the quality of care provided by an
individual physician. As long as there is no transparency on the quality of care
provided by physicians, physicians can charge supplementary fees even if the
quality of care they provide is substandard.With more transparency being created
on the quality of care provided, it is likely that the value of supplementary fees will
increasingly be questioned in the future. It can be expected that patients will only
be willing to pay supplementary fees for physicians who effectively provide above
standard quality of care. But then another problem will arise. If supplementary
fees are to be linked to objectively and transparently demonstrated top quality,
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a problem of equal access to care will arise. Limiting access to top quality care to
patients who are able to pay supplementary fees is in contradiction with the
principle of equal access to care. Equal access to health care is at the core of equity
in health which implies that ideally everyone should have a fair opportunity to
attain their full health potential and, more pragmatically, that no one should be at
a disadvantage in achieving this potential, if it can be avoided (Whitehead, 1992).
A two-tiered system, with better quality only available to those who are able
and willing to pay extra, is considered to be socially undesirable in many
countries.
4.2.3 Conclusion
Patients who pay extra money expect extra value. Convenient consultation hours
late at night may represent added value. Location can also play a role in patients’
willingness to pay supplementary fees. Patients face search costs, waiting time and
transportation costs to consult with a physician who does not engage in extra
billing in regions where physicians who stick to social security tariffs are scarce.
Perceived quality of care plays an important role in patients’ willingness to pay
supplementary fees. Growing availability of objective data on quality of care might
well be a game changer. In future, physicians will increasingly need to justify why
they charge a higher price. Limiting access to objectively proven top quality care to
patients able and willing to pay supplementary fees may not be socially acceptable
in many countries. In these countries, it is unlikely that governments will choose for
supplementary fees to be used as an incentive for physicians to provide better
quality of care.
5. Conclusion
In some countries, such as Belgium and France, physicians can charge a supple-
mentary fee on top of the tariff set by basic health insurance.
Both in Belgium and in France, there is much concern about the ﬁnancial
sustainability of the system of supplementary fees. Expenditure on supplementary
fees is increasing at a pace that exceeds the rate at which total expenditure on
health care is increasing. Both in Belgium and in France, the bulk of supple-
mentary fees is covered by additional health insurance. Sustained rapid growth of
supplementary fees leads to sharp increases in premiums for additional coverage.
In section 3, we discussed measures to contain cost inﬂation of supplementary
fees. Supplementary fees can be prohibited for certain categories of patients
(e.g. persons with low incomes) and in certain situations (e.g. emergency care).
Reference tariffs can be set and supplementary fees can be capped. Supply-side
restrictions can be introduced and differences in quality of care can be limited.
Insurers providing coverage for supplementary fees also have an important role to
play. Coverage of supplementary fees can lead to both patient-induced and
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physician-induced moral hazard. Therefore, insurers ought to effectively coun-
teract moral hazard by implementing measures such as co-insurance, deductibles
and managed care. Insurers should not shy away from legal action against
excessive supplementary fees.
The added value of supplementary fees for the physician is clear: extra
income. However, for the patient added value of supplementary fees is not clear.
Supplementary fees can buy comfort, for example, convenient consultation
hours. Physicians can refuse to treat patients who are not willing or able
to pay supplementary fees. However, there is no evidence that physicians who
charge supplementary fees provide a higher quality of care than physicians who
do not.
Today, supplementary fees are not based on hard, publicly available data on
quality of care. With information on differences in quality of care offered by indi-
vidual physicians becomingmore readily available, more transparency on the added
value of supplementary fees will be created. Physicians will have to prove that they
are ‘worth the extra money’. However, limiting access to – objectively proven – top
quality physicians to patients who can afford to pay supplementary fees, is in
contradiction with the principle of accessibility of care. To do so would be to create
a two-tiered health care system where only those who can pay supplementary
fees out-of-pocket or take out private additional health insurance to cover supple-
mentary fees have access to the best physicians. In many countries, this is considered
to be socially unacceptable.
Our conclusion is that supplementary physicians’ fees are not sustainable.
Since supplementary fees constitute an important source of revenue for certain
medical specialists and physicians are a strong lobby group, a policy gradually
restricting supplementary fees might be preferable. Today, both in Belgium and in
France, the ﬁrst steps in limiting supplementary fees have already been set. With
the lack of added value for the patient becoming more apparent, this process is
likely to continue over the next few years.
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